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ABSTRACT 
 
Economic geography has, over the last decade or so, drawn upon ideas from 
evolutionary economics in trying to understand processes of regional growth and 
change, with the concept of path dependence assuming particular prominence. 
Recently, some prominent researchers have sought to delimit and develop an 
evolutionary economic geography (EEG) as a distinct approach, aiming to create a 
more coherent and systematic theoretical framework for research. This paper 
contributes to debates on the nature and development of EEG. It has two main aims. 
First, we seek to restore a broader conception of social institutions and agency to 
EEG, informed by the recent writings of institutional economists like Geoffrey 
Hodgson. Second, we link evolutionary concepts to political economy approaches, 
arguing that the evolution of the economic landscape must be related to the broader 
dynamics of capital accumulation, centred upon the creation, realisation and 
geographical transfer of value. As such, we favour the utilisation of evolutionary and 
institutional concepts within a geographical political economy approach rather than 
the construction of a separate and theoretically ‘pure’ EEG; evolution in economic 
geography, not an evolutionary economic geography.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Economic geography has, over the last decade or so, drawn upon ideas from 
evolutionary economics in trying to understand processes of regional growth and 
change, with the concept of path dependence assuming particular prominence 
(Boschma and Lambooy, 1999; Martin and Sunley, 2006). An important insight from 
this work is that past technologies, organisational forms and habits of thought 
continue to shape the practices and actions of key actors and organisations 
(entrepreneurs, manager, workers, firms, trade unions, local government, development 
agencies, etc). Successful regional development pathways are thus dependent upon 
inherited sets of relations and practices within regions (e.g. a culture of 
entrepreneurship, a history of tolerance to new ideas, a commitment to knowledge 
development and training). The corollary is that regional decline can in some cases be 
explained by a ‘lock-in’ to outmoded methods and practices as external economic 
conditions change (Grabher, 1993; Hudson, 2005a). Such practices might have been 
beneficial to competitive success in previous industrial eras (e.g. mass production 
techniques under Fordism), but may prove a barrier to successful adjustment if market 
conditions change (e.g. the decline of mass markets and the growth of niche-based 
products). 
 
Much of the engagement with evolutionary concepts in economic geography has been 
based on case studies of individual regions, particularly old industrial regions such as 
the Ruhr, North East England and the Basque country (Grabher, 1993; Hudson, 
2005a).i More recently, however, some prominent researchers have sought to delimit 
and develop an evolutionary economic geography (hereafter EEG) as a distinct 
approach (Boschma and Frenken 2005; Journal of Economic Geography (JEG), 
2007). Animated by a certain frustration with the relatively ad hoc and under-
specified use of evolutionary concepts within existing work (for example, 
Essletzbichler and Rigby, 2007), these contributions aim to create a more coherent 
and systematic theoretical framework for research. According to an editorial in a 
recent special issue of this journal, this fledgling EEG focuses on the adaptation of the 
economic landscape over time, the processes and mechanisms behind this and the 
interaction between temporal and spatial contingency and systematic necessity. 
Processes of path dependence and creation are of central interest along with the self-
organisation of the economy and the generation of economic novelty. Echoing the 
pre-occupations of (evolutionary) economists, explanation should emphasis the 
micro-foundations of individual behaviour, although other contributions stress the role 
of institutions at the macro-level (Maskell and Malmberg, 2007).  
 
This paper contributes to debates on the nature and development of EEG. It has two 
main aims. First, we seek to restore a broader conception of social institutions and 
agency to EEG. This stems from a concern that it is overly dependent on the work of 
selected evolutionary economists such as Nelson and Winter, Arthur and David whilst 
ignoring the related tradition of institutional economics (see Hodgson, 1993; 2006). 
The notion of institutions which emerges from much of this literature is too narrow, 
regarding them as constraints on individual action and under-emphasising their 
capacity to also enable and frame action (Campbell, 1997). We are concerned at the 
over-separation of the new EEG from institutionalist economic geography (see Amin 
and Thrift, 1994; Storper, 1997) which highlights this latter aspect. In this respect, we 
seek to assess the value of evolutionary concepts for understanding the evolution of 
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the economic landscape rather than to construct a theoretically consistent and ‘pure’ 
EEG (Essletzbichler and Rigby, 2007). Our second aim is to link evolutionary 
concepts to political economy approaches, borrowing from the broader tradition of 
evolutionary political economy rather than evolutionary economics per se (Cooke and 
Morgan, 1998; Hudson, 2005b). Explanation cannot, to our mind, be couched in terms 
of individual rationalities alone; evolutionary thinking must also incorporate the social 
relations between groups of actors, raising questions of social agency and power. 
Furthermore, the evolution of the economic landscape needs to be related to 
‘structural’ processes of value creation, competition and uneven development (Smith 
et al., 2002). As such, we view both geographical political economy and 
institutionalist economic geography as key ‘missing links’ in the development of 
EEG.  
 
In developing these arguments, the paper proceeds along the following lines. In the 
next section, we review the recent literature in EEG, identifying its main strengths and 
weaknesses. The third section emphasises the need to reassert a broader sense of 
institutions and social agency, drawing on the work of institutional economists like 
Geoffrey Hodgson. This is followed by a section which examines the central concept 
of path dependency, situating the evolutionary approach within a broader 
geographical political economy framework. A brief conclusion summarises our 
arguments and considers their implications for EEG.  
 
2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMIC 
GEOGRAPHY (EEG)  
 
There is nothing particularly novel in the about use of evolutionary notions in 
explanations of regional development processes. An important antecedent to recent 
debates on path dependency is the work of Myrdal, Hirschman, Kaldor and others in 
the 1950s and 1960s which explained uneven spatial development through the 
concept of cumulative causation. These theorists viewed regional economic 
development as a “cumulatively unfolding process” (Hodgson, 2001, p. 69) in which 
rapidly growing regions were likely to stretch their lead over other regions over the 
long term as their initial competitive advantages became self-reinforcing in a virtuous 
cycle of growth. While advancing a dynamic perspective on uneven development, 
such theories tended to privilege space over time in the sense that uneven regional 
development was the focus of analysis rather than evolutionary processes per se. 
More recently, evolutionary thinking has been adopted by both geographical 
economists and economic geographers. Paul Krugman and other spatially-minded 
economists now recognise history and path dependency as central to the explanation 
of regional convergence and divergence processes (Krugman, 2003). In economic 
geography ‘proper’, more emphasis is placed on the role of knowledge and learning 
processes within and between firms in facilitating successful processes of regional 
adaptation (Boschma and Frenken, 2006).  
 
Contemporary interest in evolutionary ideas filtered into economic geography through 
the “institutional turn” of the early-to-mid 1990s (see Amin and Thrift 1994). In 
particular, inherited institutional frameworks and routines were viewed as critical in 
shaping how particular regions responded to the pressures of globalisation (Amin, 
1999; Storper 1997). Notably, Storper (1997) argued that “untraded 
interdependencies” were crucial sources of regional competitiveness. These refer to 
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the everyday routines and practices of doing business which exist between firms and 
other economic actors (e.g. trade unions, regional governments, chambers of 
commerce) within regions. These are difficult to replicate elsewhere, fostering the 
generation and circulation of specialised knowledge. From this perspective, “the 
regional development problem associated with building different systems of 
innovation thus turns essentially on building the capacities for reflexive collective 
action” (Storper, 1997, p.126). The latter is particularly important during periods of 
radical technological change, market downturn or increased uncertainty, when key 
actors within a region are faced with dilemmas of adaptation. The clear implication is 
that successful regions display greater collective action and the ability to learn than 
‘failing’ ones. As this indicates, evolution is merely one element within much of this 
work, representing part of the problem of institution-building or knowledge-
generation rather than the major focus of analysis. It is also worth noting that the 
positive dimension of institutions in enabling and facilitating action is stressed in this 
literature rather than the more negative, constraining aspect apparent in the writings of 
some economists (North, 1990; Williamson, 1985).  
 
The key concept developed in more explicitly evolutionary economic geography in 
recent years is path dependency. This originally emerged from the ‘old’ institutional 
and evolutionary economics; its genesis can be traced back to Thorstein Veblen’s 
famous question in 1898 “why is economics not an evolutionary science?” (cited in 
Martin and Sunley, 2006, p.3). Yet Veblen’s evolutionary perspective became 
marginalised within economic thought over the course of the twentieth century as 
orthodox approaches based on the principles of utility maximisation and general 
equilibrium analysis became firmly established  (Hodgson, 2001). Since the early 
1980s, however, something of a revival of evolutionary thinking has occurred, 
associated particularly with the work of David (1985), Arthur (1989) and Nelson and 
Winter (1982). David and Arthur’s work considers how certain historically specific or 
chance events set in train particular economic development trajectories, focusing 
particularly on how certain technologies are adopted and become dominant within 
economies over a long term period. Nelson and Winter’s contribution has focused on 
organisations rather than technologies, placing particular emphasis on the role of 
routines that are built up over time, providing the basis for competition between firms. 
Rather conveniently, this has left geographers to add territory - the third element in 
the holy trinity of economic geography identified by Storper (1997)  - by utilising the 
concept of path dependency to explore divergent regional development trajectories, 
assessing the extent to which regional outcomes are shaped by past events and 
decisions. 
 
A key theme here is that localised routines and practices, and the sets of social 
relations underpinning them, that have proved successful during a particular phase of 
development may prove disadvantageous as economic circumstances change, leading 
to a kind of economic cul-de-sac as economic actors become ‘locked-in’ to 
established ways of doing things. In this regard, Grabher (1993, 24) uses the example 
of the coal, iron and steel complex of the Ruhr in the 1970s and 1980s to indicate how 
“…….strongly embedded regional networks turned from ties that bind to ties that 
blind.” The concept of lock-in has three main dimensions: functional, relating to the 
nature of relations between firms; cognitive, reflecting particular world views; and 
political, relating to the social relations and power underpinning regional development 
(Hassink, 2005). The functional dimension implies a lock-in to particular methods of 
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production, forms of working or ties to particular suppliers or customers, while 
cognitive lock-in implies a failure to develop appropriate collective learning 
mechanisms that allow firms to read the signs of external change and react 
appropriately through experimentation and innovation. Political lock-in reflects the 
failure of regional political, business and labour actors to change policy mechanisms 
to encourage innovation and learning. Such collective myopia may not only inhibit 
the adaptation of the dominant industries, but also narrow the range of regional 
development possibilities as the legacy of inherited social and institutional 
infrastructures discourages the rise of new industries (see Friedrichs, 1993; Hudson, 
1994; Schoenberger, 1997, p.104 – 107). 
 
According to Boschma and Frenken (2006), the new EEG adds value to 
institutionalist economic geography through its dynamic historical approach. They 
view EEG as complementing the latter’s focus on the role of institutions in shaping 
economic development by highlighting the path dependent nature of regional 
economic change. The recent special issue of JEG advances the EEG research agenda 
considerably, with some papers addressing the question of what kind of evolutionary 
theory for economic geography to paraphrase Amin and Thrift (2000). Alongside the 
framework of Generalised Darwinism based on the concepts of variety, selection and 
retention (Essletzbichler and Rigby, 2007), complexity theory and network-based 
analysis are discussed (Martin and Sunley, 2007; Glucker, 2007), while other 
contributions develop more specific propositions for empirical analysis and testing 
(Frenken and Boschma, 2007; Bottazzi et al., 2007). While these papers are to be 
welcomed as marking a serious engagement with evolutionary thinking by economic 
geographers, our arguments focus on the need for this agenda to be informed by a 
broader sense of institutions and social agency, encouraging the development of more 
nuanced perspective on path dependency and regional adaptation. 
 
3. REASSERTING INSTITUTIONS, SOCIAL AGENCY AND POWER  
 
Without denying that evolutionary and institutional economics can be distinguished, 
we find the separation between EEG and institutionalist economic geography over-
drawn, ignoring the considerable overlap between the two approaches (see Martin, 
2000). In particular, Boschma and Frenken (2006) regard EEG as a third way between 
neoclassical (represented by the new geographical economics of Krugman and others) 
and institutionalist economic geography, embedded in social relations, although they 
do consider the interfaces between these. This emergent version of EEG is centred 
upon firms and learning, permitting the adoption of quantitative modelling techniques 
associated with neoclassical economics, albeit on the basis of different micro-
foundations. The effective banishment of institutions results in not only an over-
emphasis on the importance of organisational routines, but also a rather restricted 
view of agency in terms of ‘bounded rationality’ (Maskell and Malmberg, 2007). This 
reading of evolutionary thinking seems to reflect a rather partial perspective drawn 
from the more biologically-informed work of Nelson and Winter (1982) (see 
Hodgson, 1995), on the one hand, and the rather limited view of institutions – as 
essentially constraining structures for individual agency (Cumbers et al., 2003) – 
derived from the writings of North (1990) and Williamson (1985) on the other. There 
appears to be little interest in how individual rationalities and organisational routines 
are actually constructed over time, requiring a deeper engagement with notions such 
as interests, values and habit, not to mention power (Allen, 2003).  
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As indicated earlier, two contrasting dimensions of institutions can be identified in the 
social science literature. These view them, negatively, as constraints on action and 
emphasise their positive role in framing and enabling action respectively. The notion 
of institutions as constraints is associated with the ‘new institutional economics’ 
(Williamson, 1985) and the seminal work of the economic historian Douglas North. 
North (1990, p.3) defines institutions as “rules of the game … or … humanly devised 
constraints” which structure interaction in society and the conduct of individual 
actors.  In addition to neglecting the positive, enabling role of institutions, North 
identifies institutions closely with formal, legal rules, neglecting less formal habits 
and rules, despite some acknowledgement of ‘informal constraints’ (Hodgson, 2006, p 
9-10). Such an emphasis perhaps reflect a preference for the more tangible and 
measurable aspects of institutions amongst economic analysts dissatisfied with the 
vagueness of the broader definition favoured by institutionalist like Hodgson, drawing 
on the ‘old institutional economics’ (OIE) tradition of Veblen and others. North’s 
definition is echoed by the ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach in comparative political 
economy (Hall and Soskice, 2001) which examines how the institutional elements of 
different national economies constrain the ability of firms and other economic actors 
to adapt to changing economic conditions (Amable, 2003; Hall and Soskice, 2001), 
leading to path dependency and lock-in (Arthur, 1989). The adoption of North’s 
constraint definition in the new EEG (Maskell and Malmberg, 2007) contrasts with 
the positive, enabling aspect apparent in institutionalist economic geography (Amin 
and Thrift, 1994; Storper, 1997), limiting the scope for cross-fertilisation between 
them. This serves to emphasise that the adoption of a particular concept or definition 
of institution from neighbouring disciplines such as institutional economics needs to 
be accompanied by an appreciation of the debates surrounding this term in the 
‘parent’ disciplines (see Martin and Sunley, 2001; 2006).   
 
Hodgson (2006, p.1) adopts a broader definition of institutions as “systems of 
established and prevalent social rules that structure social interactions”. They “enable 
thought, expectation and action by imposing form and consistency on human 
activities”, depending upon individual behaviour without being reducible to it (p.2). 
Contrary to the emphasis in North’s writings, rules incorporate social norms and 
conventions as well as legal rules (p.2). Institutions are constraining and enabling, 
limiting what is permissible or acceptable but also facilitating certain activities with 
the rules of language for instance, underpinning communication. This conception 
owes much to the OIE with the emphasis on social rules and non-reducibility to 
individual interests rendering it distinct from the ‘new’ institutional economics of 
Williamson and others (see Cumbers et al., 2003). Yet the OIE failed to explain the 
causal processes involved in the shaping of individual preferences by institutions 
(Hodgson, 2002), tending to equate institutions with regularised patterns of behaviour 
and to present an over-socialised conception of agency where individual tastes and 
preferences are determined by culture (see Lawson, 2003). Some evolutionary 
economists have expressed discomfort at the apparent vagueness of this “broad and 
roomy definition of institutions” and the tendency to “call any widespread practice an 
institution” (Nelson, 1995, p.81).  
 
His efforts to improve on the formulations of the OIE and to address such criticisms 
led Hodgson (2006) to emphasise the importance of habit, defined as a disposition to 
engage in certain behaviour or thought, facilitated by a particular stimulus or context. 
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Essentially, habits represent the key links between institutions and individual 
behaviour:  
By structuring, constraining and enabling individual behaviours, institutions 
have the power to mould the capacities and behaviour of agents in fundamental 
ways: they have a capacity to change aspirations instead of merely enabling or 
constraining them. Habit is the key mechanism in this transformation. 
Institutions are the social structures that can involve reconstitutive downward 
causation, acting to some degree upon individual habits of thought and action 
(ibid, p.6).  
Thus, the notion of ‘reconstitutive downward causation’ through the acquisition of 
habits represents the crucial mechanism by which institutions shape individual 
conduct, leading to regularities of behaviour. Individuals are socialised through pre-
existing rules and norms, resulting in the reproduction of institutions. Accordingly, 
institutions are “both objective structures ‘out there’ and subjective springs of human 
agency ‘in the human head’” (ibid). Rather than representing sources of inertia and 
stasis, they are subject to transformation through the effects of conscious human 
action (see Lawson, 2003). This formulation seems broadly reminiscent of the 
sociological concept of structuration (see Giddens, 1984; Jessop, 2001), stressing the 
reciprocal relationship between social structure and human agency (Hodgson, 2002). 
While Hodgson makes few explicit references to critical realism and the ‘ontological 
movement in economics’ (Wilson, 2006), his definition of institutions is consistent 
with the ‘transformational model of social activity’ developed by Tony Lawson 
(1997, 2003). This contends that social structures and institutions exist as a process of 
reproduction and transformation, possessing “emergent powers”, which are 
irreducible to individual agency, although they depend upon it for activation or 
manifestation.  
 
This emphasis on the interaction between social structure and human agency, 
mediated by institutions, raises the question of how to conceptualise the economic 
actor. In this respect, contributions to the new EEG have been keen to ground 
explanations in the micro-foundations of individual action, providing some basis for 
rapprochement with the methodological predilections of economists (Boschma and 
Frenken, 2006; Boschma and Martin, 2007). At the same time, the need to abandon 
the attachment to the orthodox notion of utility-maximising actor is recognised, with 
notions of perfect rationality replaced with bounded rationality (Boschma and 
Frenken, 2006; Maskell and Malmberg, 2007). From this perspective, economic 
decision-making in the face of uncertainty and in the possession of limited 
information is guided by existing routines and rules. Institutions can play an important 
role in reducing such uncertainty by structuring interactions and providing a common 
framework of expectations (Stanfield, 2006, p.252). Rather than being solely 
concerned with pursuing their economic self-interest, agents are concerned with 
dignity and self- and social-image (ibid). It is this combination of a broader set of 
motivations and less cognitive competence, relative to orthodox approaches, that is at 
the heart of evolutionary economics’ conception of the economic actor (ibid). As 
such, while mathematical models and econometrics have a role to play in 
understanding behaviour, it is important that the fledgling EEG does not “become just 
another playground for modellers and mathematicians” so that “the questions of 
realisticness, empirical grounding and operational usefulness in policy terms” are not 
ignored (Hodgson, 1995, p.481). Formal modelling must be accompanied by concrete 
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investigations into the actual actions and motivations of real individuals and 
organisations operating in specific historical and geographical contexts, requiring the 
deployment of surveys, interviews and ethnographic methods (Stanfield, 2006, p.251).  
 
Individual economic agents shape evolutionary processes in the context of existing 
institutions. Individuals are socialised in particular time-space contexts according to 
prevailing social rules and norms, but this does not preclude them acting creatively to 
transform existing structures (Lawson, 2003).ii This process of socialisation is shaped 
by the past, meaning that: 
economic agents have and make history. Their actions are conditioned from that 
which has gone before, they have antecedence, and their actions in turn 
condition that which is yet to unfold; they have consequence. (Stanfield 2006, 
p.250).  
Furthermore, the goals of particular agents and the methods that they adopt in pursuit 
of them are shaped by their past social interactions while both goals and methods are 
reassessed as part of a “continuous interactive process” (ibid, p.251). The emphasis on 
both the importance of habit and routine and the transformative role of individuals 
does, however, present something of a conceptual problem (Maskell and Malmberg, 
2007). Since institutions and the social rules that they embody operate ‘behind the 
back’ of individual agents, fostering taken-for-granted norms and understandings, it is 
difficult to imagine how such individuals can consciously identify aspects of the 
institutions in need of transformation (ibid, p.610). Even the more positive conception 
of institutions as enabling action is largely concerned with how habits and routines 
underpin learning in relation to familiar issues and patterns (Stanfield, 2006, p.290-1). 
This dilemma can perhaps be best handled by avoiding over-socialised approaches 
inherited from the old institutionalism and arguably reproduced in the notion of ‘path 
dependency’ (see next section; Hudson, 2005a), emphasising the importance of 
creativity and the generation of innovation and novelty in the economy (Martin and 
Sunley, 2006).   
 
The separation between evolution and institutions within the fledgling EEG risks 
overlooking the important role of institutions in shaping processes of economic 
change (Hodgson, 2006; Nelson, 1995; Stanfield, 2006). Indeed, institutions (along 
with technology) have themselves been regarded as important ‘carriers of history’ in 
institutionalist economic geography (Martin, 2000), acting to preserve existing social 
practices and routines and to transmit elements of them into the future. In some cases, 
these can persist long after the productive base of the economy associated with them 
has disappeared, representing a form of ‘cognitive lock-in’ (Grabher, 1993).iii Yet it is 
important to avoid the tendency, inherited from the OIE particularly, to equate 
institutions with inertia, rigidity and stasis whilst associating technology with 
dynamism, novelty and change, effecting too stark a dichotomy between the two 
(Lawson, 2003). While the notion of institutions as constraints on action is derived 
from North rather than the OIE, it nonetheless focuses attention on their role in 
‘limiting’ or even ‘preventing’ the exploration of possibilities (ibid, p.609). In 
response to the rather impoverished view of institutions as sources of inertia, the 
simple fact that institutions are also subject to processes of change and transformation 
must be asserted (Lawson, 2003). In addition to constraining action, institutions also 
enable it in various ways, not least by providing the social rules that reduce the 
uncertainty confronting economics agents to manageable levels (Stanfield, 2006).  
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The self-organisation of the economic landscape represents another emerging theme 
in EEG (Boschma and Martin, 2007). This refers to the notion that an aggregate 
spatial order emerges from the complex interactions between the behaviour of 
different economic actors. This is consistent with an influential strand of economic 
thinking about institutions, associated particularly with the Austrian school of 
economics. Key figures such as Carl Menger and Hayek argued that institutions and 
other social phenomena can arise as unintended outcomes of the interactions between 
agents (Hodgson, 2006). Indeed, Menger attempted to explain the development of 
money in this fashion, in opposition to the ‘state theory’ promoted by the German 
historical school and others (Hodgson, 2002). This emphasis on self-organisation, 
however, seems to owe as much to methodological preference of economists for 
explanations rooted in the preferences of individual agents as to its empirical value in 
elucidating the evolution of the economy. It is criticised as excessive by Hodgson 
(2006), resulting in the neglect of other mechanisms of institutional emergence, 
reproduction and transformation. Foremost among these is the state whose role in 
shaping the evolution of the economic landscape should not be underplayed (Hudson, 
2005a). The role of national states in creating certain development paths is apparent 
from the examples of the East Asian ‘tiger’ economies since the 1960s, in addition to 
Ireland and Finland in Western Europe (Martin and Sunley, 2006). At the regional 
scale too, state agencies have shaped processes of economic adaptation and change as 
demonstrated by, for example, the ‘four motors’ regions of Europe (Baden 
Württemberg, Catalonia, Lombardy and Rhone-Alps) in the late 1980s and 1990s 
(Dunford et al., 1997).    
 
In addition to the dangers of importing an underlying methodological individualism, 
EEG, we would argue, risks becoming overly firm-centric in its analysis. It has 
offered little explicit consideration of the role of other sets of actors such as labour, 
community groups and the state in shaping the evolution of particular places, despite 
the development of the ‘new labour geography’ and an extensive literature on the 
changing role of the state in economic development policy (see Herod, 1997; Martin 
and Sunley, 1997). Here, we should clarify that we are referring to efforts to name and 
delimit EEG in more specific terms (Boschma and Frenken, 2006; JEG, 2007) rather 
than case study research on regional adaptation, within which the role of state 
agencies is prominent (although labour and community groups rarely appear). More 
than this, the social relations between such actors receive no attention. Indeed, such an 
orientation seems to be largely precluded by favoured theoretical and methodological 
frameworks adopted which tend to emphasise features such as complex systems, non-
linear dynamics, spatial competition and selection and stochastic growth processes 
(Bottazzi et al., 2007; Essletzbichler and Rigby, 2007; Frenken and Boschma, 2007; 
Martin and Sunley, 2007), privileging quasi-natural or technological forces over 
institutions and social relations (Lawson, 2003).  
 
At the same time, a broader conception of agency must recognise how the social 
relations between different groups influence the evolution of the economy. The 
differential capacities of particular agents and groups to access and process 
information can itself be seen as an important source of social and economic 
inequality (Stanfield, 2006). Existing patterns of social inequality shape the 
socialisation of individual agents and influence the extent to which individual and 
groups participate in socio-economic activity (ibid). The different positions and 
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interests of particular individuals and groups can generate conflict over adaptation 
strategies at the level of individual firms, clusters and regions. This requires 
sensitivity to questions of power and interest, recognising that such strategies are 
often formulated by dominant or hegemonic groups, although often requiring some 
negotiation with, and persuasion of, other interests.iv While particular agendas may 
become dominant, setting in train particular industry or regional pathways, such 
agendas are always open and contested. In this sense, power relations are viewed as 
entangled (Sharp et al., 2000), subject to ongoing debates and struggles, with the 
authority of certain groups remaining vulnerable to resistance and opposition. From 
this perspective, power is never an absolute property which a particular group can 
capture and hold indefinitely, but something with is actively exercised through 
prevailing social networks and institutions (Allen 2003).  
 
4. REGIONAL EVOLUTION AND PATH DEPENDENCY  
 
In addition to the links between evolutionary and institutionalist perspectives, we are 
also concerned with the relationship between evolutionary and political economy 
approaches (Hudson, 2005b). We view the adoption of a geographical political 
economy approach as helping to provide a broader and more critical understanding of 
regional adaptation processes. As contributors to the emerging EEG have recognised 
(Boschma and Martin, 2007; Martin and Sunley, 2006), the Marxist geography of the 
1970s and 1980s was concerned with the long-run development of cities and regions, 
emphasising how existing spatial arrangements were periodically disputed by the 
introduction of new technologies, production methods and organisational structures 
(Harvey, 1982; Massey, 1995). In the absence of an engagement with political 
economy, our concern would be that EEG, somewhat ironically, risks reproducing 
some of the problems of institutionalist economic geography, despite the separation of 
the two approaches (Boschma and Frenken, 2006).  These problems involve a neglect 
of: the unequal power relations which shape the construction of regional agendas, the 
role of broader extra-regional networks and processes and the activities of national 
states in underpinning regional development (MacLeod, 2001; MacKinnon et al., 
2002). In the first part of this section, we address certain key issues concerning the 
conceptualisation of path dependence in a regional context (Martin and Sunley, 2006) 
before attempting to recast this in a broader political economy framework. 
 
Foremost among these is the question of determinacy or whether the notion of path 
dependency fosters a deterministic understanding of regional economic change, over-
emphasising the connections between past and present (Hudson, 2005b, p.16). There 
is a tendency for path dependency to be treated in an over-socialised and 
technologically determinist manner whereby specific ‘carriers of history’ (institutions, 
technologies, firms) impart strong, self-reinforcing continuities upon broader 
trajectories of regional economic evolution (Hudson 2005a). This grants little sense of 
agency to regional actors once a particular trajectory has been set in train (Grabher, 
1993; Hassink, 2005). Here, we are informed by the revised definition of institutions 
(Hodgson, 2006) discussed in the previous section, stressing the role of human agency 
in reproducing and potentially transforming prevailing social rules and institutions. 
This implies that the process of regional evolution is an ongoing and iterative one – 
“path as process” (ibid, p.11) – that can have many different branching points rather 
than a fixed trajectory set in train at key moments. Clearly, if we accept the role of 
history in shaping economic development as a dynamic process unfolding over time, 
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it is important to recognise that regional trajectories will diverge according to 
particular strategies adopted and that economic actors operate in the context of past 
decisions. Individual agents both shape and are shaped by broader processes of 
economic change, in an ongoing fashion, rather than being structurally constrained by 
them once particular pathways are set in train. Deterministic notions of path 
dependency underplay the importance of novelty and creativity in the evolutionary 
process (Martin and Sunley 2006), and these are often associated with regional 
innovation or diversification (Chapman et al., 2004). 
 
Recognising that economic evolution is “always the contingent outcome between 
change and inertia” (Martin 2006, p.169), notions of ‘path contingency’ (Hudson 
2005a) may be more useful by emphasising the relatively open-ended nature of 
evolutionary processes, albeit within the context of bounded determinacy imparted by 
existing structures (Massey, 1995). Whilst much attention has focused on the process 
and outcomes of path dependence, the actual agents, mechanisms and institutions 
through which regional pathways are actually constructed and followed have been 
neglected (Martin and Sunley, 2006). The notion of path contingency, we argue, 
offers the potential for a more nuanced sense of agency that provides a stronger 
purchase on regional adaptation than the more simplistic binary implied by successful 
modernisation or renewal versus lock-in to obsolete technologies and organisational 
routines (see Grabher, 1993; Hassink, 2005). As this suggests, lock-in is generally 
viewed in negative terms as a barrier to adaptation despite also having positive 
connotations in terms of economic specialisation, externalities and increasing returns 
(Hassink and Shin, 2005; Martin, 2006). The influence of this entrenched binary 
seems to have inhibited thinking about the potentially more varied predicaments and 
development paths of regions (Gertler, 2003). In this context, Martin and Sunley 
(2006) identify different ways by which regional economies can avoid negative ‘lock-
in’ through adaptation, involving: the establishment of new indigenous development 
paths in the context of a new technological paradigm; the existence of heterogeneity 
among agents, technologies, institutions and networks; the transplantation of new 
organisational forms, technologies or firms from outside; diversification into new 
markets; and the radical upgrading of the industrial base (Chapman et al., 2004).  
 
The over-determined view of path dependence in evolutionary thinking also neglects 
the issues of path creation and path destruction (see Martin and Sunley, 2006). While 
the former is often reduced to external forces or events, viewed as accidents of history 
in some accounts, the latter tends to be attributed to the persistence of inherited 
institutions and routines which are out of tune with new forms of economic 
organisation and technology (see Hudson, 2005a). A more rounded view would be 
that “the process of economic evolution must be understood as an ongoing never-
ending interplay of path dependence, path creation and path destruction that occurs as 
actors in different arenas reproduce, mindfully deviate from and transform existing 
socio-economic-technological structures, practices and development paths” (Martin 
and Sunley 2006, p.408). Rather than being merely the product of chance or historical 
accidents as Krugman (1991) and prominent evolutionary economists have suggested, 
purposeful human action is central to the creation of and adaptation of particular paths 
(Martin and Sunley, 2006). As we indicated in the previous section, the role of the 
state and regional state agencies is often central to path creation through the formation 
of accumulation strategies which typically identify the key priorities for the regional 
or national economy in question and attempt to construct a shared vision around this 
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(see Jessop, 1997). Many strategies have focused on enhancing competitiveness in 
recent years, informed by ‘benchmarking’ exercises with assess performance against 
‘competitor’ regions (Bristow, 2005; Martin, 2006).  
 
A key issue in attempting to ‘unpack’ the concept of regional path dependency 
concerns the precise object(s) which it applies to. Is it the regional economy itself or a 
region’s constituent firm or industries (Martin and Sunley, 2006)? The concept of 
path dependency was originally applied to the technological and organisational 
spheres in explaining why particular technologies (for example, the QWERTY 
keyboard or internal combustion engine) or firms are able to eliminate competition 
and became dominant over the long-term. Care should be taken in employing ideas 
about the evolutionary behaviour of individual agents and entities to the development 
of more complex social phenomenon such as regions. To provide an obvious example, 
successful adaptation for a firm may lead it to close down its regional operations and 
locate elsewhere (Schamp, 2001). Here, Essletzbichler and Rigby (2007) usefully 
distinguish between evolution in regions through competition between plants within a 
region, understood as a common selection environment, and the evolution of regions 
through competition based on organisational and technological variety.  
 
We are ultimately interested in the evolution of regional economies rather than firms 
or industries, although it is important to stress that it is key agents, organisations and 
groups that actually act in the context of prevailing institutions and structures. Firms 
are of central importance here, but the role of other groups, particularly labour and the 
state, should not be overlooked. As suggested by the realist emphasis on a stratified 
reality (Lawson, 1997; 2003), path dependency can occur at different levels and the 
evolution of a regional economy is itself the aggregate outcome of the decisions of 
key actors. The relationship between firms and regions is not one-way, of course, with 
the attributes of regions such as institutions, routines, technological mixes, forms of 
knowledge and skills exerting a crucial influence over the competitiveness of the 
former (Dicken and Malmberg, 2001). This implies that the issue here is largely a 
choice of contrasting conceptual and methodological entry points. As existing case 
studies suggest (Chapman et al., 2004; Grabher, 1993; Hassink, 2005), analyses of 
regional evolution must examine the key industries and firms within the region in 
question while a geographically-sensitive analysis of firm or industry evolution will 
highlight the effects of the broader regional environment.  
  
While the Marxist geography of the 1970s and 1980s may have reduced regional 
economic change to the ‘inner contradictions’ of capitalism in some cases (Boschma 
and Martin, 2007, p.539), we would maintain that regional path dependence must be 
related to the broader dynamics of capital accumulation (Hudson, 2006). These 
dynamics are underpinned by the creation of value through the labour process and its 
realisation through market exchange (Smith et al., 2002). This helps to focus attention 
on two areas of analysis largely overlooked in discussion of regional path dependence 
thus far: production and the labour process and the uneven relations between regions, 
structured by the geographical transfer of value (ibid). This latter aspect can be seen 
as part of the broader shift towards a more relational perspective on regions (Allen et 
al., 1998; Coe et al., 2004; Yeung, 2005). Echoing  Massey’s earlier concept of the 
spatial division of labour, the concept of territorial divisions of labour provides a 
framework for examining what forms of production are found in different places, 
emphasising the labour process and the value extracted by different actors within a 
 12
production ‘chain’ or network (Dunford, 2003; Dunford and Greco, 2006). Thus, for 
example, following the shift to an outward processing trade regime in the European 
clothing sector in the late 1980s and 1990s, production was relocated to lower-cost 
locations in Central and Eastern Europe while design, retailing and overall control 
remained concentred in Western European countries, allowing the latter to appropriate 
the majority of value (Smith et al., 2002, p.51-54).    
 
From this perspective, the evolution of regions is conditioned by their position within 
wider territorial divisions of labour, and path dependence can be seen as a product of 
the succession of roles that a region has played within these (Massey, 1995). Large 
corporations select particular locations for investment while regional actors formulate 
particular strategies which insert their regions into broader divisions of labour in 
particularly ways. Regions can become ‘locked in’ to particular roles, reflecting the 
concentration of either high or low value-added activities there, although dramatic 
changes and reversals are also apparent as demonstrated by the emergence of ‘new 
industrial spaces’ in the 1970s and 1980s in Europe and North America (Scott, 1988), 
for instance, and the decline of old industrial regions (Hudson, 1989). These tend to 
be bound up with broader shifts in prevailing technologies and modes of organisation 
(from example, the shift from Fordism to flexibility in the 1970s and 1980s). In this 
context, ‘lock-in’ appears as more of a contingent effect of broader processes of 
territorial development than a structural cause of regional decline. Thus, it is their 
reduced attractiveness, relative to other locations such as ‘new industrial spaces’, that 
explains the decline of ‘rustbelt’ regions such as the Ruhr and North East England 
since the 1970s rather than the effect of ‘lock-in’ to out-moded forms of organisation 
and technology. As such, EEG must avoid a fixation with processes of path 
dependence and ‘lock-in’ per se; relating such processes to particular region’s 
changing position within wider territorial divisions of labour. This means, in turn,  
that the evolution of the space-economy more broadly is shaped by inherited regional 
arrangement, indicating that processes of path dependence in the economy are 
themselves place dependent (Martin and Sunley, 2006).  
 
A political economy also foregrounds issues of power and politics that surround 
processes of regional adaptation. Our thinking here is also informed by relational 
perspectives which contend that regions themselves are social (and often temporary) 
constructions with varying degrees of political and economic integrity (Allen et al., 
1998; Hudson forthcoming). As such, regions therefore need to be viewed as (always 
temporary) collective assemblages of actors whose interests will sometimes diverge 
and come into conflict. The potential for the dominance of a particular set of interests 
over others raises the normative and political questions of whom or what is doing 
what kind of adaptation and in whose interests (Pike et al. 2006)? Democratic and 
participatory approaches to regional development may promote more sustainable 
forms of economic development by fostering heterodox thinking over narrow 
conformity (Pike, 2004). On the one hand, successful regional adaptation may be 
more likely to be achieved in circumstances where the institutional culture tolerates 
openness, variety and a willingness to challenge established orthodoxies (see Amin, 
1999; Grabher and Stark. 1997). For older institutionalists such as Veblen this would 
equate to instrumental over ceremonial values (Bush, 1987; Tool, 1979), where 
dissent from the mainstream is tolerated to the extent that it can lead to innovation 
critical for economic renewal. There are also likely, however, to be limits to diversity. 
Infinite variety may result in a situation where the “noise” generated “runs the danger 
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of suppressing selection with the result that less efficient forms might deprive more 
efficient forms of resources to an extent that locks the evolution of an entire 
economy” (Grabher and Stark, 1997, p.536). Questions of governance therefore loom 
large in understanding the ability of regional actors to develop sustainable forms of 
economic development which allow both effective adaptation to change whilst 
maintaining equity and diversity. 
 
Our final point in this section concerns the need to view regional adaptation in the 
context of national political economies, overcoming the tendency of regionally-
focused research in economic geography to neglect this ‘missing link’ (Hudson, 2003; 
MacLeod, 2001; MacKinnon et al., 2002). Research on ‘successful’ regions in Europe 
highlighted the importance of this relationship (Dunford, et al., 1997), while our 
analysis of old industrial regions in Western Europe’s largest economies highlights 
the connections between regional and national economic performance (Cumbers et al., 
2006). In accounting for differential national performance, institutional economists 
and economic sociologists have drawn attention to the persistence of institutional 
variation, identifying distinct national ‘varieties of capitalism’ (Amable, 2003; Hall 
and Soskice, 2001). Ultimately, however, this approach remain dependent on a rather 
one-sided and limiting view of institutions as constraints on action, overlooking their 
positive, enabling role, and is solely concerned with the national scale, ignoring 
evidence of regional variety in institutional endowments (see Essletzbichler and 
Rigby, 2007). While the attention of EEG is rightly focused on the latter, the role of 
national political economies in framing and mediating processes of regional 
adaptation should not be overlooked.     
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper has sought to contribute to the development of a new EEG (Boschma and 
Frenken, 2006; JEG, 2007). The underlying question addressed in this paper can be 
characterised, to paraphrase Amin and Thrift (2000), as ‘what kind of evolutionary 
theory for what kind of evolutionary economic geography?’ We are particularly 
concerned by the tendency to separate the fledgling EEG from institutional economic 
geography (Boschma and Frenken, 2006; Boschma and Martin, 2007). Crucially, the 
tendency to prise the two approaches apart leaves this putative EEG looking 
somewhat barren and impoverished, reflecting an evacuation of institutions and social 
agency. Our argument is that a broader sense of social agency and institutions must be 
recovered from the work of Hodgson and other institutionalists, helping to inform an 
clearer understanding of the key notions of ‘path dependency’ and ‘lock-in’ (Martin 
and Sunley, 2006). Institutionalism is also part of the heterodox tradition within 
economics (Lawson, 2006), overlapping significantly with evolutionary economics. 
Certainly, although perhaps not all evolutionary economists would also regard 
themselves as institutionalists, key institutionalists like Hodgson also characterise 
their work as evolutionary. In his recent work, Hodgson (2002; 2006) defines 
institutions as systems of established social rules, identifying habit as the key 
mechanism though which institutions mould individual behaviour through 
‘reconstitutive downward causation’. Economic actors remain capable of adapting and 
changing inherited institutional arrangements, however, as also indicated by the 
‘transformational model of social activity’ developed by Lawson (1997; 2003). While 
institutions are themselves important ‘carriers of history’ in the economy’ they are 
also subject to change and transformation (ibid.). The emphasis on human creativity is 
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important in overcoming over-socialised notions of path dependency, stressing the 
importance of novelty and in the economy. Institutions function not only as 
constraints on individual behaviour (Maskell and Malmberg, 2007; North, 1990), but 
also enable and frame action in a positive sense, not least by reducing the uncertainty 
facing economic actors through the provision of a common framework of 
expectations (Stanfield, 2006).  
 
The second ‘missing link’ in the development of EEG emphasised in this paper is that 
with political economy approaches. As key argument is that the evolution of the 
economic landscape must be related to the broader dynamics of capital accumulation 
which are centred on the creation, realisation and geographical transfer of value 
(Smith et al., 2002). Moving beyond well-rehearsed critiques of institutional 
economic geography (MacKinnon et al., 2002; MacLeod, 2001), there is a need to 
incorporate an awareness of unequal power relations within regions, the role of the 
national state and the importance of external relations into accounts of regional 
adjustment. The broader definition of institutions derived from Hodgson (2006) helps 
to challenge over-determined views of path dependency, stressing the transformative 
role of human agency in the context of prevailing rules and institutions (Lawson, 
2003). Human creativity is associated with the generation of novelty in the economy, 
often manifest in forms of regional innovation and diversification (Chapman et al., 
2004). As such, the more open-ended notion of path contingency (Hudson, 2005a) 
seems to allows greater scope for exercise of social agency. By stressing the varied 
predicaments and development paths of regions, it also enables us to overcome the 
entrenched binary between successful modernisation or renewal, following successful 
efforts by regional actors and organisation to upgrade the industrial base, and 
continuing ‘lock-in’ to outdated technologies and practices (Gertler, 2003), indicating 
that path creation and destruction can occur through a range of mechanisms (Martin 
and Sunley, 2006). Rather than being the result of ‘chance discoveries’ and historical 
accidents’ (Krugman, 1991), regional adaptation processes are shaped by the 
strategies of key actors and organisations (Pinch and Henry, 1999). Here, the role of 
the state and regional state agencies is often central and EEG needs to incorporate a 
broader and more concrete sense of agency that moves beyond ‘bounded rationality’ 
and firm-centric analyses. The development of regional adaptation strategies needs to 
be assessed in the context of the social relations between different groups and 
interests, raising normative and political questions about whom or what is undertaking 
what kind of adaptation in whose interests (Pike et al., 2006). From a broader political 
economy perspective, ‘lock-in’ can itself be seen as a contingent effect of broader 
processes of uneven development. The concept of territorial divisions of labour 
(Dunford, 2003) is particularly useful here in providing a framework for examining 
the connections between adaptation processes in different regions. Accordingly, we 
favour the utilisation of evolutionary and institutional concepts within a geographical 
political economy approach rather than the construction of a separate and theoretically 
‘pure’ EEG; evolution in economic geography, not an evolutionary economic 
geography.v  
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NOTES 
 
i Although Asian regions have also attracted attention and an evolutionary strain was 
evident in some studies of successful regions such as the ‘Third Italy’ and Silicon 
Valley (Cooke and Morgan, 1998; Saxenian, 1994). 
ii While Veblen was sharply critical of Marx’s materialist reading of history, his own 
position shared much with the latter’s famous aphorism that people “make their own 
history, but ... they do not make it  under circumstances chosen by themselves, but 
under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past” 
(Marx, 1977, p.300). 
iii Hudson (2005a) provides an example from the North East of England in terms of 
how expectations of wage labour in large organisations outlived the collapse of the 
region’s heavy industries, undermining successive ‘enterprise’ initiatives focused on 
indigenous SMEs.    
iv This can be seen as a restatement, albeit in very different language, of the concern 
with ‘ceremonial values’ that characterised the OIE (Bush, 1987; Tool, 1979).  
v To paraphrase Johnston’s (1991) comments on regional geography.  
